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SEIZING A CELL PHONE INCIDENT TO ARREST: DATA
EXTRACTION DEVICES, FARADAY BAGS, OR ALUMINUM
FOIL AS A SOLUTION TO THE WARRANTLESS CELL PHONE
SEARCH PROBLEM
Adam M. Gershowitz*
When police conduct a lawful custodial arrest, can they search the cell phone in
your pocket? Numerous courts have reached conflicting conclusions on this question.
This Article argues that police should only be permitted to seize cell phones incident
to arrest. If the police are concerned about data being remotely wiped from the phone
while they wait for a search warrant, the officers should preserve the data by using
either a data extraction device to copy the phone’s contents, an inexpensive bag called
a Faraday cage to prevent remote wiping of the cell phone, or a simple sheet of alumi-
num foil to immobilize the phone.
Under the search incident to arrest doctrine, police have long been permitted to
open any item on an arrestee, whether they have probable cause for that particular item
or not.1 The rationale is that arrestees could try to destroy evidence or use hidden ob-
jects to harm officers.2 And because police conduct millions of searches per year,3 the
Supreme Court has established a bright-line rule.4 Decades of precedent therefore seem
to indicate that police can search through the full contents of any item on an arrestee,
including electronics.5
But surely cell phones must be different. After all, while wallets hold business cards
and a few scraps of paper, cell phones contain thousands of pictures, emails, Facebook
information, Internet browsing history, and map locations—and that is just the informa-
tion accessible from the first screen of the device. If the police can search your cell
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I am grateful to Jeff Bellin and Paul
Marcus for helpful suggestions and to Jake Derr and Peter Landsman for research assistance.
1 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that police officers may
search one’s person incident to arrest, including any containers on the person); Wayne A. Logan,
An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 381, 394 (2001).
2 See Logan, supra note 1, at 391–92 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 56 (1950)).
3 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 27, 47 (2008) [hereinafter Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment].
4 See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (holding that the search incident to arrest doctrine is auto-
matic, regardless of the actual presence of the doctrine’s rationale).
5 See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 38–39 (dis-
cussing the lack of “any conceptual difference between searching a person’s body or physical
containers on that body for drugs and searching electronic equipment for digital information,”
as first recognized by the Fifth Circuit).
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phone incident to arrest, then they can search your entire life. And they would have this
power even if they arrested you for a low-level crime—think of public intoxication,
petty theft, or even texting while driving6—because longstanding doctrine indicates that
the scope of the search has no relation to the severity of the crime of arrest.7
In these circumstances, what are courts to do? Should they follow decades of prece-
dent from the pre-Internet era even though that seems illogical? Or should they disre-
gard controlling Supreme Court precedent and try to carve out a new search incident
to arrest rule that would only apply to cell phone searches?
This Article suggests that the lower courts (and eventually the Supreme Court)
should only allow police to seize cell phones incident to arrest. Then, while waiting for
a search warrant, police should preserve the cell phone data by using either a data ex-
traction device to copy the phone’s contents, an inexpensive bag called a Faraday cage
to prevent remote wiping of the cell phone, or a simple sheet of aluminum foil to immo-
bilize the phone.
After briefly surveying the state of the law, I review some of the other proposals
for limiting cell phone searches and explain why they are flawed.8 I then explain the
practical ease with which police would be able to seize a phone and preserve its data
while waiting for a search warrant.9 Finally, I review previous instances in which the
Court has allowed warrantless seizures, but not searches, and demonstrate how cell
phones fit squarely into that paradigm.10
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW: CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY
The initial response by most courts to warrantless cell phone searches incident to
arrest was to rely on Supreme Court precedent for tangible items.11 Led by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,12 most courts concluded that cell phones are con-
tainers in the same way that wallets, pockets, and purses are containers, and that the
phones can therefore be searched incident to arrest.13 By 2010, more than thirty courts
6 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Texting While Driving Meets the Fourth Amendment: Deterring
Both Texting and Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 593–96 (2012).
7 See, e.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236–37 (holding that an arrest for driving with a re-
voked license gave police officers sufficient authority to search the arrestee without addi-
tional justification).
8 See infra Parts I, II.
9 See infra Part III.
10 See infra Part IV.
11 See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 38–40.
12 See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 2007).
13 See Adam M. Gershowitz, Password Protected? Can a Password Save Your Cell Phone
from a Search Incident to Arrest?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1137–38 n.66 (2011) [hereinafter
Gershowitz, Password Protected?] (listing numerous recent opinions upholding the legality of
warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest).
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had issued opinions approving warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest.14 As
the years ticked on and cell phone technology became more sophisticated, however,
courts began to challenge the conventional wisdom.15 In a prominent decision, the Ohio
Supreme Court prohibited warrantless cell phone searches incident to arrest because
cell phones “are capable of storing a wealth of digitized information wholly unlike any
physical object found within a closed container.”16 A smattering of lower courts joined
suit.17 And in May 2013, the Florida Supreme Court18 and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit19 both concluded that police are not permitted to conduct a warrant-
less cell phone search simply because they have first arrested the phone’s owner.
As of mid-2013, dozens of courts have issued rulings on the constitutionality of
warrantless cell phone searches, and there is a considerable split among state supreme
courts and federal circuits.20 On one side, the majority of courts, including the Califor-
nia Supreme Court,21 as well as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth,22 Fifth,23
Seventh,24 Tenth,25 and Eleventh Circuits26—have approved warrantless searches. On
the other side, the Ohio Supreme Court,27 the Florida Supreme Court,28 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals,29 and various lower state and federal courts have rejected warrantless
searches.30 It seems inevitable that the Supreme Court of the United States will grant
certiorari on this issue in the near future.31 But then what? With the technology rapidly
changing and the Justices not being particularly tech savvy, will the Court be able to
fashion a workable rule?
14 Id. at 1139.
15 As Judge Posner described in 2012, “analogizing computers to other physical objects when
applying Fourth Amendment law is not an exact fit because computers hold so much personal
and sensitive information touching on many private aspects of life.” United States v. Flores-
Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 178
(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16 State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
17 See Gershowitz, Password Protected?, supra note 13, at 1139 n.76.
18 See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 738 (Fla. 2013).
19 See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013).
20 See infra notes 21–30 and accompanying text.
21 See People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505–06 (Cal. 2011).
22 See United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 410–12 (4th Cir. 2009).
23 See United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007).
24 See United States v. Pineda-Areola, 372 F. App’x 661, 663 (7th Cir. 2010).
25 See Silvan W. v. Briggs, 309 F. App’x 216, 225 (10th Cir. 2009).
26 See United States v. Fuentes, 368 F. App’x 95, 99 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
27 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio 2009).
28 See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 738 (Fla. 2013).
29 See United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013).
30 For other cases rejecting the search incident to arrest of cell phones, see Gershowitz,
Password Protected?, supra note 13, at 1139 n.76.
31 See Orin Kerr, First Circuit Rules that Police Need a Warrant to Search a Cell Phone In-
cident to Arrest, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 17, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013
/05/17/first-circuit-rules-that-police-need-a-warrant-to-search-a-cell-phone-incident-to-arrest/.
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II. THE FLAWS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Scholars have weighed in with numerous suggestions, but they all suffer flaws. For
instance, in an earlier article, I suggested that police be permitted only to search open
applications on a phone, or that they be permitted only to take a certain number of steps
to open additional applications.32 But such a rule is arbitrary and promotes police
lying.33 Another proposal is to allow the police to search the phone incident to arrest
only when there is reason to believe evidence related to the crime of arrest could be
found, as the Court now does with searches of automobiles incident to arrest.34 This
would reduce the extent of warrantless searches (a good thing), but would mire courts
in retrospective fact-bound questions about whether there was reason to believe evi-
dence could be found in the phone. A third alternative would be to change nothing and
have cell phones be governed by precedent designed for the tangible world.35 But, as
noted above, this would allow police to search huge amounts of private data with no
particularized suspicion. A fourth possibility would be to simply ban all cell phone
searches without a warrant.36 This idea, without anything more, would be troubling be-
cause police would be powerless to prevent a suspect or co-conspirator from remotely
wiping the phone while the police await a warrant.37 None of these solutions, there-
fore, strikes an effective balance between protecting private information and permitting
the police to capture evidence that could easily be destroyed before a warrant can
be procured.
III. THE BETTER APPROACH: WARRANTLESS SEIZURES AND DATA PROTECTION
A better solution would be to fight fire with fire or, more aptly, to fight technology
with technology. The Supreme Court should allow police to seize phones incident to
arrest and then require the officers to procure a warrant before searching the phone.
While awaiting the warrant, police should be encouraged to use existing technology
32 See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 53–56.
33 Id.
34 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009). I first proposed this idea prior to the Gant
decision. See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 48–49. A
prominent Fourth Amendment scholar has recently endorsed this view. See Orin S. Kerr, Fore-
word: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 406–07 (2013).
35 See Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 45.
36 See, e.g., Mina Ford, Note, The Whole World Contained: How the Ubiquitous Use of
Mobile Phones Undermines Your Right to Be Free from Unreasonable Searches and Seizures,
39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077, 1102–03 (2012).
37 As Judge Posner has observed, “remote-wiping capability is available on all major cell-
phone platforms; if the phone’s manufacturer doesn’t offer it, it can be bought from a mobile-
security company.” United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2012). Even
without an application that remotely wipes the phone, a co-conspirator (for example, a drug-
dealer’s spouse) could erase data from the phone while sitting at a home computer.
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that prevents the phone’s data from being remotely destroyed. There are three easy op-
tions that officers could utilize: (1) a data extraction device that copies the contents on
the phone onto a secure site; (2) a Faraday bag that fits around the phone and prevents
data from being remotely erased; or (3) a simple piece of aluminum foil that officers
can wrap around the phone and disable it. Here is how the Court should proceed.
First, the Supreme Court should forbid warrantless cell phone searches incident to
arrest unless there is a specific exigency. For instance, if police arrest a key player in
a drug conspiracy and have specific reason to believe that his arrest will lead to other
conspirators trying to wipe incriminating text messages from a cell phone,38 then police
should be permitted to search the phone without a warrant. In such a circumstance,
though, the authority to search without a warrant would come from the traditional exi-
gency exception, not the search incident to arrest doctrine.39 Or think of a case where
a suspect is arrested in connection with a kidnapping and police want to search his cell
phone for any information about the victim’s whereabouts.40 Searching without a war-
rant should be permitted under the exigency exception because there is a specific exi-
gency, not because there is a theoretical possibility of destruction of evidence that could
be avoided with a search incident to arrest.41
But would banning cell phone searches incident to arrest allow the destruction of
evidence, which is the main rationale for the search incident to arrest doctrine?42 If the
Court disallowed searches of cell phones incident to arrest, would it not just be empow-
ering criminals to remotely wipe evidence of their illegality? The answer is no because
there are three simple ways that police can prevent data destruction while awaiting a
search warrant.
38 See Schlossberg v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 n.3 (D. Or. 2012) (“One exam-
ple, however, of a situation where an immediate search might be necessary is an instance where
an officer had credible information that a suspect’s accomplice was at a remote location and was
planning to use Apple’s remote-wipe program which allows an iPhone user to delete all informa-
tion stored on an iPhone and restore it to factory settings with the click of a button from a remote
location.”). Additionally, consider an application called TigerText that “lets users remotely delete
their text messages from other peoples’ phones.” See Chloe Albanesius, Tiger Text App Lets You
Remotely Delete Text Messages, PC MAG. (Mar. 4, 2010, 4:29 PM), http://appscout.pcmag.com
/mobile-apps/270582-tiger-text-app-lets-you-remotely-delete-text-messages.
39 See United States v. Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1150 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (collecting cases
where courts have relied on the exigency doctrine to search cell phones).
40 See Eunice Park, Traffic Ticket Reasonable, Cell Phone Search Not: Applying the Search-
Incident-to-Arrest Exception to the Cell Phone as “Hybrid,” 60 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 489–90
(2012) (outlining a similar scenario involving child exploitation).
41 See Gomez, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 1150–51 n.17 (noting that “while agents testified to their
speculation that a cell phone could theoretically be ‘wiped’ remotely by an unknown third party,
each agent testified that they had no reason to believe that Defendant’s specific cell phone was
capable of remote deletion” and rejecting the Government’s exigency rationale).
42 No one suggests that the other rationale for the search incident to arrest doctrine—police
officer safety—is implicated by cell phone searches.
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A. Data Extraction Devices to Copy Cell Phone Contents
The first option is for police to download and copy the data on the cell phone with
a data extraction device. For instance, a company called Cellebrite manufactures the
“Universal Forensic Extraction Device” (UFED), which conducts a “bit-for-bit extrac-
tion and in-depth analysis of data from thousands of mobile devices, including feature
phones, smartphones, portable GPS devices, [and] tablets.”43 The U.S. Department of
Justice found that the UFED could download all the photos and videos from an iPhone
within ninety seconds.44 Using a data extraction device is therefore faster and much
more likely to prevent destruction of evidence than an officer manually and aimlessly
searching a phone one application at a time.
When the civil liberties community learned about data extraction devices, their ini-
tial reaction was outrage. In 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) accused
the Michigan State Police of downloading cell phone data without a warrant.45 The
Michigan State Police denied engaging in that practice, and the controversy died a
quick death.46
With the exception of the ACLU’s criticism of the Michigan State Police, there has
been relatively little publicity about the UFED devices. You might therefore be sur-
prised to learn that the devices are in use by federal law enforcement agencies, as well
as police in New York, Los Angeles, Sacramento, and many smaller towns across
the country.47
Depending on the version of the device, the UFED costs between a few thousand
dollars and $11,500.48 At that price, most police departments would be unlikely to buy
multiple devices. Thus, police departments might have to look for another option to
43 Petach Tikva, Cellebrite Delivers First Physical Extraction Solution for Nokia BB5
Devices, CELLEBRITE.COM (July 26, 2012), http://perma.cc/0rPkbrZSnMd.
44 See Mike Masnick, Michigan State Police Say It’ll Cost $545k to Discover What Info It’s
Copying Off Mobile Phones During Traffic Stops, TECH DIRT (Apr. 20, 2011, 10:44 AM), http://
www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20110420/01070213969/michigan-state-police-say-itll
-cost-545k-to-discover-what-info-its-copying-off-mobile-phones-during-traffic-stops.shtml.
45 ACLU of Mich., ACLU Seeks Records About State Police Searches of Cellphones,
ACLUMICH.ORG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.aclumich.org/issues/privacy-and-technology
/2011-04/1542.
46 See Nathan Olivarez-Giles, ACLU Concerned over Michigan State Police Extracting Data
from Cellphones, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/tech
nology/2011/04/aclu-concerned-over-michigan-state-police-extracting-phone-data.html.
47 See Huntsville Man Arrested for Child Pornography, HUNTSVILLE ITEM (Mar. 20,
2013), http://itemonline.com/local/x2000917412/Huntsville-man-arrested-for-child-pornog
raphy (explaining that Huntsville, Texas, purchased the Cellebrite equipment with a grant);
Nick Taborek, You’re Under Arrest! Hand over that iPhone, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.business week.com/articles/2012-03-29/youre-under-arrest-hand
-over-that-iphone (noting Cellebrite use by the federal government, New York, Los Angeles,
and Sacramento).
48 See Taborek, supra note 47.
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briefly preserve the cell phone’s data while taking the phone to the site where the
UFED is located. As explained in Parts III.B and III.C below, there is an easy solution
for preventing the contents of the phone from being remotely wiped.
B. Faraday Bags to Isolate the Phone and Prevent Remote Wiping
In addition to (or in lieu of) a data extraction device, police could use a fairly in-
expensive option called a Faraday cage while they apply for a search warrant.49 If you
own a microwave oven, you have a Faraday cage in your home.50 Simply put, an alumi-
num structure keeps radio waves from reaching the other side of the cage.51 Companies
already manufacture Faraday bags designed specifically for law enforcement to hold
cell phones and prevent remote wiping.52 Once placed into a Faraday bag, the phone
can no longer communicate with the outside world and thus cannot be remotely wiped
by a conspirator.53 The U.S. Department of Justice has recommended that agents place
any seized cell phone in a Faraday bag as soon as possible to avoid remote wiping.54
Anyone can purchase a Faraday bag for as little as thirty dollars,55 and police de-
partments would likely get a better price if they bought in bulk. Of course, thirty
dollars’ worth of equipment is burdensome if every officer in the entire police depart-
ment must have a Faraday bag. But there is no need for that. Most officers will not be
conducting cell phone searches. Rather, it is officers in narcotics units, those patrolling
the highest crime areas where drug dealing is rampant, cops investigating child pornog-
raphy, and possibly agents working on white-collar cases that would have need to
quickly capture a cell phone. If officers working “regular” beats had an unusual case
49 Judge Posner and the authors of two law review articles have considered using Faraday
bags to solve the search incident to arrest problem, although neither Judge Posner nor the law
review articles’ authors considered the prospect of the phones being pre-programmed to delete
data. See United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2012); Charles E. MacLean,
But, Your Honor, a Cell Phone is not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest Call for a Return to
the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest, 6 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 37, 50–51 (2012); Samuel J. H. Beutler, Note, The New World of Mobile
Communication: Redefining the Scope of Warrantless Cell Phone Searches Incident to Arrest,
15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 375, 395–96 (2013).
50 See MacLean, supra note 49, at 50 n.82.
51 See id.
52 For instance, a product called “Black Hole Faraday Bag—RF Signal Isolation for
Forensics, Standard Window Size” is “designed to aid law enforcement, military, and consul-
tants in the collection, preservation, transport, and analysis of wireless evidence” and is avail-
able for sale for fifty-eight dollars on Amazon.com. Black Hole Faraday Bag—RF Signal
Isolation for Forensics, Standard Window Size, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com
/Black-Hole-Faraday-Bag-Isolation/dp/B0091WILY0 (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
53 See id.
54 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, AWARE-
NESS BRIEF: FIND MY IPHONE 3 (2009).
55 See MacLean, supra note 49, at 50.
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and needed to preserve cell phone data, they could call into dispatch and wait for an-
other officer to bring a Faraday bag to the scene. There would be some chance that data
could be remotely wiped during this short wait, but the chance would be very slim.56
The bigger problem with the Faraday bag solution is that it will not prevent the
phone from erasing data that has been pre-programmed to delete after a certain period
of time. There are now cell phone applications that will destroy data after a fixed period
of time. The most famous example—Snapchat—allows a message to survive only for
up to ten seconds,57 but other applications such as Wickr and TigerText allow the mes-
sages to be visible for longer.58 For instance, TigerText allows users to send a text
message to another phone, but to keep the message stored on the application’s servers.59
The visual display of the message only appears on the recipient’s phone for a preset
period of time—anywhere from sixty seconds to five days—before the message is de-
leted from the phone.60
Applications like Wickr and TigerText pose a problem, although a very small one.
Most drug dealers or child pornography users will not have their cell phone data preset
for self-destruction. And while a handful might have the foresight to program the phone
to delete sensitive material, Fourth Amendment rules have never turned on law enforce-
ment’s ability to capture every last piece of evidence. Rather, the Supreme Court seeks
(or should be seeking) sensible bright-line rules that the police can understand and fol-
low and which maximize privacy protection where possible. If police want a one hun-
dred percent certainty that no evidence will be deleted from a seized cell phone while
officers apply for a warrant, then police departments should invest in the Cellebrite
UFED technology in order to instantly download the contents of the phone.61
A good analogy is the Court’s 2013 decision in Missouri v. McNeely,62 which re-
jected automatic warrantless blood draws in drunk driving cases.63 In McNeely, the
Government contended that when a driver refuses a breathalyzer test, the police should
per se be able to draw his blood without a warrant under an exigency rationale.64 The
56 Indeed, placing a cell phone in a Faraday bag and preserving the evidence might be faster
than the officer conducting an aimless search of the phone without a warrant. See, e.g., Beutler,
supra note 49, at 396. This would be particularly true if the phone were password protected.
57 See Jefferson Graham, Snapchat’s Young Audience Fuels a Growth Streak, USA TODAY
(June 5, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/talkingtech/2013/06/05
/snapchat-growth-streak/2359129/.
58 See Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Wickr: Can the Snapchat for Grown-Ups Save You
from Spies?, MASHABLE (Mar. 4, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/03/04/wickr/; Belinda
Luscombe, TigerText: An iPhone App for Cheating Spouses?, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www
.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1968233,00.html.
59 See Luscombe, supra note 58.
60 See id.
61 See discussion supra Part III.A.
62 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013).
63 Id. at 1568.
64 Id. at 1560. While the Court rejected a per se rule, it left the door open to some warrantless
blood draws on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1561.
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Government argued that it needed warrantless blood draws because not having a
prompt blood test around the time of arrest would make it more difficult to convince
juries to convict defendants in drunk driving cases.65 The Court was not moved by the
argument that making life slightly harder for law enforcement in a small percentage of
cases supported a warrantless search.66 If jurisdictions want to have stronger drunk-
driving prosecutions, they can spend the money to have judges on call to sign warrants
in the middle of the night.67
It is true that using Faraday bags would be slightly more expensive than warrantless
searches and carry a small risk of evidence destruction. But just as in the blood draw
situation, the Court has never guaranteed the police the cheapest and easiest way to
gather evidence.
C. Aluminum Foil: The Cheap and Simple Solution
A final solution is remarkably simple: aluminum foil. The primary material for
making a Faraday bag is aluminum foil.68 Anyone—including the police—can watch
an instructional YouTube video about building a Faraday device.69 Or, if the police do
not want to build a structure, they can simply buy a roll of aluminum foil for two dollars
in a grocery store and leave it in their vehicle. When the police seize a phone, they sim-
ply have to wrap the phone in a few layers of aluminum foil, and the chance of remote
wiping of the phone will be almost completely eliminated.70
As with a Faraday bag, the aluminum foil method may not prevent one hundred
percent of evidence from being wiped from the phone while police await a warrant, but
it should come very close. Police departments that are strapped for cash could embrace
the aluminum foil solution and be left in nearly the same position as if they had pur-
chased UFEDs, used Faraday bags, or even conducted warrantless cell phone searches.
65 See id. at 1565.
66 Id. at 1565–66.
67 For a similar example, consider the Court’s recent decision holding that the use of a drug-
sniffing dog on the porch of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. See Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). In light of that decision, officers investigating drug activity at
a home must obtain probable cause from another source, perhaps an airplane flyover, see
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), or an informant assigned to go into the house and
report back on any drugs inside, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). These alterna-
tives are surely more expensive and time-consuming, but that does not somehow make the drug-
sniffing dog automatically reasonable. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
68 See Make a Faraday Cage Wallet, WIRED, http://howto.wired.com/wiki/Make_a_Faraday
_Cage_Wallet (last modified Oct. 16, 2008, 10:56 PM).
69 See, e.g., How to Make a Faraday Wallet, YOUTUBE (May 12, 2011), http://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=C9J28juJPuo.
70 For a video example, see David Nash, Aluminum Foil Faraday Cage Test, YOUTUBE
(Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfDQBo3MM0I (using only one layer of
aluminum foil). As with the more traditional Faraday bag, there is still a chance that the phone
is pre-programmed to delete valuable data by itself without contact from an outside signal.
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IV. PRECEDENT SUPPORTING WARRANTLESS SEIZURES
WHILE AWAITING A SEARCH WARRANT
The big question is whether the Supreme Court would be on firm footing in allow-
ing police to seize a phone incident to arrest, but requiring a warrant before permitting
a search of the phone’s contents. The answer would seem to be yes.
The most analogous comparison is the Court’s 2001 decision in Illinois v.
McArthur.71 The police had probable cause to believe McArthur had marijuana in his
house, but they lacked a warrant to enter.72 Rather than entering and searching without
a warrant, the officers took the less invasive action of preventing McArthur from enter-
ing his home for two hours while they applied for a warrant.73 McArthur moved to sup-
press the marijuana and related contraband on the ground that the police had seized him
for a lengthy period of time without a warrant.74 The Supreme Court rejected that argu-
ment, explaining that “[w]e have found no case in which this Court has held unlawful
a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent
the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period
of time.”75 The Court praised the police officers for utilizing “a restraint that was both
limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while protecting
privacy interests.”76
The Court’s Terry v. Ohio77 doctrine also supports the idea that sometimes the po-
lice should be permitted to seize but not search.78 For instance, in a decision thirty years
ago, the Court explained that if police have reasonable suspicion that a piece of luggage
contains drugs, they can detain the suitcase, effectively seizing it without a warrant,
71 531 U.S. 326 (2001). The Court has reached similar conclusions in other cases. See, e.g.,
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (“[A] seizure affects
only possessory interests, not privacy interests. Therefore, the heightened protection we accord
privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of premises, not a search, is at issue.
We hold, therefore, that securing a dwelling, on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the de-
struction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreason-
able seizure of either the dwelling or its contents. We reaffirm at the same time, however, that,
absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search . . . is illegal.”); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 13 n.8 (1977) (rejecting a warrantless search of a footlocker and noting that “[a]
search of the interior was therefore a far greater intrusion into Fourth Amendment values than
the impoundment of the footlocker”).
72 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 328.
73 Id. at 329.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 334.
76 Id. at 337.
77 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
78 See generally id. (articulating the view that reasonable suspicion gives police officers the
right of protective seizure and limited search of a person—a “stop-and-frisk”—without violating
the Fourth Amendment).
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while awaiting a drug dog.79 The officers would not be able to open that luggage with-
out a warrant, however, even if they had probable cause for it.80
CONCLUSION: A SIMPLE RULE THAT PROTECTS
PRIVACY WITHOUT LOSING EVIDENCE
In the cell phone context, there is very good reason for the Court to adopt a rule
only allowing warrantless seizures. First, it is the simplest rule for police to implement.
If police are only allowed to seize a cell phone incident to arrest, they do not have to
determine whether it is reasonable to believe the phone will carry evidence related to
the crime of arrest. Nor would they have to determine what functions on the phone they
may search. Officers also would not have to guess how long they are permitted to
search through the reams of photos, videos, emails, text messages, and other data that
could take hours to review. In addition to simplicity, a rule that only allows a warrant-
less seizure of the phone is far more protective of privacy than authorizing a warrantless
search of the data on the phone. No suspect wants her phone to be seized, but almost
everyone would prefer that the police have to obtain permission from a neutral magis-
trate before officers search the phone.81 Indeed, in some cases, the magistrate may
refuse to issue the search warrant or may impose limits on what functions and applica-
tions the police can search on the phone. Finally, police can seize the phone without any
serious risk of losing evidence. Many police departments are already using technology
that enables them to download an exact copy of the phone’s data. Police departments
79 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700 (1983) (finding detention to be unreasonable
in this case because police took the luggage for ninety minutes and brought it to an airport
across town).
80 In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Court also embraced a rule that authorized warrantless
seizures (but not searches) of packages found in automobiles. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 766 (1979). Unfortunately, the Court made this rule too confusing (and too easy to manipu-
late) by also approving warrantless searches if police had probable cause for the entire vehicle,
rather than just the package. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). By 1991, the
Court gave up the effort to draw a distinction between a car that happens to turn up a container
and a container that happens to turn up a car. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
Under the current rule, “police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” Id. at 580.
81 As Justice Harlan explained (unsuccessfully) in the automobile exception context, “the
lesser intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure . . . [that] enable[s] the officers to obtain
a search warrant.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Divining and Designing the Future of the
Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine: Avoiding Instability, Irrationality, and Infidelity, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1469 n.283 (“There is a plausible argument that the damage done to privacy
interests by the search of a vehicle (and its contents) is markedly more severe than the damage
done to possessory interests by a seizure of that same vehicle, and, as a consequence, that officers
should be compelled to choose the seizure alternative so that if they are wrong in their probable
cause assessments the less serious injury will be inflicted.”).
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that lack the funds to purchase data extraction devices can utilize inexpensive Faraday
bags to prevent remote wiping of the phone. And departments truly strapped for cash
can equip their officers with a two-dollar roll of aluminum foil that will likewise pre-
vent almost all data loss.
Police departments might prefer to have unrestricted authority to conduct warrant-
less cell phone searches incident to arrest. But the Fourth Amendment does not guaran-
tee the police the most convenient searching method. And in a world where tremendous
amounts of private data are held on cell phones, giving officers carte blanche to conduct
warrantless and even suspicionless searches makes little sense when simple, cheap, and
effective alternatives exist. The Supreme Court should therefore resist the urge to create
a complicated rule to deal with warrantless cell phone searches. It should simply pro-
hibit warrantless searches, allow police to seize the phones, and let evolving technology
handle the rest.
